In 2019 Tanisha M. Fazal and Paul Poast published an article in Foreign Affairs titled “War is Not Over.” The article argued that war is alive and well despite some arguments to the contrary and that the field of IR has been skewed by World wars I and II.
[…] World Wars I and II have severely skewed our sense of what war is. Scholars and policymakers tend to view these conflicts as emblematic of war. They are not. Most wars are relatively short, lasting less than six months. They tend to result in 50 or fewer battle deaths per day—a number that pales in comparison to the figures produced during World War I (over 5,000 dead per day) and World War II (over 7,000 per day). In fact, if one excludes these two outliers, the rates of battle deaths from the mid-nineteenth century until 1914 are consistent with those in the decades since 1945.
There have, in fact, been a number of great-power wars since 1945. But they are rarely recognized as such because they did not look like the two world wars.
They also note that interstate conflict can come out of intrastate conflict — wars like those in Korea and Vietnam led to the US and China coming to direct combat. One of our cases comes into being in this manner.
As a result of our skewed baseline, there are several conflicts and regions that have been neglected. I mentioned Latin America as one such neglecting before. There have been interstate conflicts in the Western Hemisphere; they have flown under the radar for their lack of great power participants and World War-like chaos. I hope to begin the change in that.
There is also a movement in the history field to take a more hemispheric approach by viewing the entire American continent as one unit, instead of dividing it between the United States (and Canada) on one hand, and Latin America and the Caribbean on the other. Looking at interstate conflicts in the Americas allows for this hemispheric approach, as well as finally adding some variety to the IR field with non-great power warfare.
The Mexican-American War, the Paraguayan War (or War of the Triple Alliance), and the War of the Pacific all touch on these issues. The Mexican-American and Paraguayan Wars bridges cultural gaps; the United States represents the North American, anglo-sphere, while Mexico is Spanish-speaking and in many ways, the heart of Spanish-speaking Latin America. The Paraguayan War includes Portuguese-speaking Brazil along with Spanish-speaking Argentina and Uruguay facing off against Spanish and Guraní-speaking Paraguay. Border changes were significant in each as well, with Mexico losing about half of its territory to the US, Bolivia becoming landlocked, and Paraguay losing significant territory too.
As far as casualties go, in So Far from God, John S.D. Eisenhower states “Of the 104,556 men who served in the army, both regulars and volunteers, 13,768 men died, the highest death rate of any war in our [US] history,” in regard to the Mexican-American War. The Paraguayan War was the bloodiest war in South America’s history, with Paraguay’s losses estimated around 300,000 by some sources.
With conflicts this costly and impactful, there is no reason they shouldn’t be utilized as case studies in International relations to expand the universe of analysis and test hypotheses. So with that said I will analyze these three conflicts using IR realism. All three cast studies allow for excellent examples of internal and external balancing. Internal balancing takes center stage in the Mexican-American War leading to the US’s victory, and also plays an important role in the War of the Pacific with Chile prevailing over its opponents. External balancing is the most important factor in the Paraguayan War, although Paraguay did have internal balancing factors working in its favor.
Mexican-American War
The war between neighbors gives us a clear window into war and how different factors must be taken into account. The war was the result of, and resulted in, the US gaining territory at Mexico’s expense. The US was on a quest to the Pacific and Mexico was in its way. So when James K. Polk came to the White House, he was determined to make good on his goal of extending the borders to the Pacific Ocean.
This was a war fought, for the most part, on Mexican soil. So naturally Mexico enjoyed a home field advantage. The country also had an advantage of numbers. Not only were there more Mexican soldiers on the fields of battle, there was also the added advantage of Mexican civilians. But this seems to be where the favors ended for Mexico. The first Mexican negative and American opportunity was the administration of territories. Alta California and Nuevo Mexico were for all intents and purposes autonomous regions under a Mexican flag. Alta California wasn’t even administered as a single de facto unit, with Pío Pico operating around Los Angeles and José María Castro holding sway over the north at Monterey. These territories were also sparsely populated with the population density of California, in 1846, being one person per twenty-six square miles with the population coming to roughly 25,000 people and only about 10,000 being white.
As a result, Eisenhower notes:
Manifest Destiny, in practical terms, was far from unrealistic, for the territories the United States coveted were nearly empty, and the people living in Texas, New Mexico, and California were already enjoying a state of semiauntonomy within the republic of Mexico. They constituted the portion of the old Spanish Empire where “Spain’s imperial energy had faltered and run down…”
While Mexico was troubled with leadership problems — Santa Anna was exiled and took power again during this period, and there was plenty of infighting among military leadership — the United States was able to field a, not perfect, but effective authority to execute the war. The quality of the leadership was higher for US forces as well. The war is famous for being a sort of training ground for the future leaders of the American Civil War, but Winfield Scott led a brilliant amphibious invasion of Mexico and campaign to occupy Mexico City. Zachary Taylor fought well in Texas and Northern Mexico, stonewalling Mexican forces which resulted in Santa Anna combating the American invasion with diminished manpower.
The United States, according to John S.D. Eisenhower, fielded much better organized, disciplined, and motivated forces than Mexico, “but in some instances, as at Buena Vista, Mexican numerical superiority was so great that decimation of the American force would have been inevitable save for one factor: superior weaponry and the ability to use it.” The United States’s naval power also fits into this internal balancing equation. Using the navy in critical operations in the western theater to capture California and to invade Mexico at Veracruz and support ground forces tipped the scales that much more in its favor and against Mexico, which had no naval capabilities worth speaking of. When it comes to internal balancing, in this instance the United States was masterful. Taking on negative aspects such as fighting on foreign soil with outnumbered forces, the US took on this mission with superior artillery, small arms, and organization, along with leadership that put it in a position to prevail. Mexico failed to keep pace technologically or tactically and strategically and suffered defeat.
The Paraguayan War, also known as the War of the Triple Alliance, was fought between Paraguay on one side and an alliance of Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay on the other. Like our previous case, it ended with a total victory by the Triple Alliance. The first thing to notice here is the external balancing. Brazil, Argentina, and Colorado-led Uruguay aligned themselves to take on Paraguay; and Paraguay wasn’t able balance externally, being forced to do battle on its own after the defeat of the Blancos. This alone was enough to be the deciding factor.
War began after the creation of Uruguay and the subsequent civil war between the Blancos and Colorados, with Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay all jockeying for influence in the new state. After the Colorados prevailed, the Paraguayan War kicked off.
The Paraguayan War is a pretty simple example of how balancing, or lack there of, can determine the outcome of a conflict with certainty. And how far misunderstandings can go, leading to complete disasters.
First, let’s take a look at the Triple Alliance, the best example of external balancing during the conflict, and one of our two cases of the phenomenon. Unnatural allies Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay formed an alliance to combat Paraguay. It could be argued that this alone was enough to secure a victory for the allies. Paraguay was in no position to counter this. With the Triple Alliance formed, for all intents and purposes, Paraguay was surrounded. The human resources if the alliance dwarfed those of Paraguay as well. The allies could call on three times the personnel that Paraguay could; during the battle of Corrales, Argentina “outnumbered the Paraguayans by over eight to one…”
The three nations, bringing their powers together, also had use of a sophisticated navy and were able to use a combined land and naval strategy to over power the Paraguayans.
Paraguay, on the other side, was dealt a very limited hand. It was already landlocked and had a smaller population. The smaller nation was able to implement some hit-and-run tactics early on on land and in the rivers, being able to deal some blows to the Brazilian navy and shake the alliance’s forces on land. Another form of internal balancing practiced by Paraguay was with the structure of it’s military. In order to increase the manpower, universal conscription was implemented and Marshal López began to build up his military in preparation of a fight against his much larger neighbors. The Paraguayans were well-trained, loyal, and disciplined. But there was only so much upside to a military that was working with “the most antiquated flintlocks, unrifiled cannons, locally made sabers, and bamboo lances.”
The balancing that did and didn’t take place among the belligerent nations of the Paraguayan War determined the outcome almost before the battles began to take place. This was one of the most devastating conflicts in the Western Hemisphere, sharing that infamous distinction with the American Civil War.
War of the Pacific
The War of the Pacific is a conflict that has been widely overlooked. Sharing a nomenclature with the Pacific theater of World War II has contributed to this, but so has location and participants. The Andean region isn’t exactly as central to the world’s eye as Western Europe or the Middle East. Although William F. Slater devoted significant real-estate in Andean Tragedy: Fighting the War of the Pacific, 1879-1884 to explain the military consequences of the conflict, the balancing displayed during the War of the Pacific is informative. One can see how states behave while dealing with impending conflict.
The war began over contested claims to territories on the Pacific coast of South America that contain nitrates. Peru and Bolivia held de jure control of these provinces and Chile needed access. There were also geopolitical aspects to this conflict that Slater clearly explicates in his prose. The focus here, though, will be what the belligerent states did to strengthen themselves in an attempt to emerge victorious against their opponents.
It must be noted that because the participants didn’t learn the lessons of recent conflicts (American Civil War & Franco-Prussian War) they doomed themselves to repeat the mistakes. Using modern weapons with antiquated tactics spelled disaster for all involved. But to the balancing, the most obvious is Peru and Bolivia’s alliance. This external balancing instantly gave the allies a population advantage. The two states had as much as 100 times the combined population as Chile and as many as three times as many soldiers. But internally, both states struggled. Military composition, arms, and ineffective administration hindered both Peru and Bolivia.
On the other hand, Chile practiced enough self-help to eventually prevail. For starters, Chile had an officer corps that had been educated at its Escuela Militar. To go along with this educated officer corps, Chile also reorganized its army to have larger, more standard-sized infantry units; it also used standardized weapons. The allies lacked all of this, most damaging being the lack of standardized weapons that compounded their supply problems.
Although the naval campaign, from which Chile emerged victorious, neither of the participants really had much worth speaking of. Bolivia effectively had no navy and both Peru and Chile had disorganized naval forces that suffered from under training and heavy desertion rates. Chile arguably had a better officer class, but both employed foreign mercenaries and had navies composed of ships purchased from Great Britain and the US.
Chile prevailed in the War of the Pacific because of the internal balancing it practiced. Better training for its officer corps in both the army and the navy along with weapons standardization and better organization allowed it the overcome the Peru-Bolivia alliance and capture territory on its way to victory.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we can see how balancing affects the outcome of war. All of the victors effectively balanced internally and/or externally. The United States and Chile practiced self-help and prevailed over Mexico and Peru and Bolivia, respectively. On the other hand, Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay combined forces and utterly overwhelmed a Paraguay that failed to balance internally.
By beginning to examine oft-overlooked conflicts such as these, new and existing hypotheses can be tested. Variety of cases will also add to the validity of findings. Work is being done, but there are so many possibilities.